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ABSTRACT: With this contribution, we underline some of the different problems that the recent 
Italian practice related to the control of migration flows by sea may raise. We examine the closed-
ports strategy and the problems connected to the choice to cooperate with third countries in order 
to stop migration flows arriving by sea. A specific insight will be dedicated to the responsibility for 
failed rescue operations at high sea in the light of the recent practice. Furthermore, the examination 
of some recent developments will make it possible to verify if a real shift in Italian migration policy 
has been enacted. Finally, the paper will end with a brief consideration of the cooperation framework 
that needs to be developed at the EU level in order to improve the management of migration flows 
arriving by sea to Italy and other European countries.
KEYWORDS: Migration by sea, Italian Practice, Territorial waters, Ports, NGOs, Cooperation with 
third Countries.
EL CONTROL DE LOS FLUJOS MIGRATORIOS EN EL MEDITERRÁNEO CENTRAL: 
PERSPECTIVAS DESDE LA PRÁCTICA ITALIANA RECIENTE
RESUMEN: Con esta contribución, destacamos algunos de los diferentes problemas que puede 
plantear la reciente práctica italiana relacionada con el control de los flujos migratorios por mar. 
Examinamos la estrategia de los puertos cerrados y los problemas relacionados con la opción de 
cooperar con terceros países para detener los flujos migratorios que llegan por mar. Se dedicará una 
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visión específica a la responsabilidad de las operaciones de rescate fallidas en alta mar a la luz de 
la práctica reciente. Además, el examen de algunos desarrollos recientes permitirá verificar si se ha 
producido un cambio real en la política migratoria italiana. Finalmente, el trabajo terminará con una 
breve consideración del marco de cooperación que debe desarrollarse a nivel de la UE para mejorar 
la gestión de los flujos migratorios que llegan por mar a Italia y a otros países europeos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Inmigración por mar, Práctica italiana, Aguas territoriales, Puertos, ONG, 
Cooperación con terceros países.
I. FOREWORD
Because of  its geographical position, Italy is, by nature, the front door 
for migrants arriving in Europe through the Central Mediterranean Sea. 
In general, the intention of  migrants is not to remain in Italy but to move 
towards Northern EU countries where they expect to find a better social 
welfare system and a better chance for integration. However, the mechanism 
provided by the Dublin Regulation2 entails that Italy – when it is the first 
EU Member State entered by a migrant – will be the country responsible in 
most cases for examining the application for international protection usually 
presented by those who arrive by sea. Consequently, the social burden deriving 
from migration is particularly significant for Italy. 
Especially in recent years, this situation has had repercussions at the 
political level. One of  the main arguments of  the Italian populist parties who 
won the general election in 2018 has been the need to stop migration flows 
arriving by means of  the Central Mediterranean route, leading to the well-
known closed-ports policy aimed at preventing the arrival on Italian shores of  
vessels carrying migrants saved from shipwrecks.
In this paper, we will shortly examine the closed-ports strategy and the 
problems connected to the choice to cooperate with third countries in order 
to stop migration flows arriving by sea. A specific insight will be dedicated to 
the responsibility for failed rescue operations at high sea in the light of  the 
2 Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of  the Member States 
by a third-country national or a stateless person, OJEU L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 31. The critical 
aspects of  the Dublin system have been stressed, inter alios, by Di Filippo, M. “The allocation 
of  competence in asylum procedures under EU law: The need to take the Dublin bull by the 
horns”, Revista de derecho comunitario europeo, 2018, pp. 41-95.
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recent practice. Furthermore, the examination of  some recent developments 
will make it possible to verify if  a real shift in Italian migration policy has 
been enacted. Finally, the paper will end with a brief  consideration of  the 
cooperation framework that needs to be developed at the EU level in order to 
improve the management of  migration flows arriving by sea to Italy and other 
European countries.
II. THE CLOSED-PORTS POLICY
In order to reduce sea arrivals, the Italian Government in office from 1 
June 2018 to the beginning of  September 2019 enacted a restrictive approach 
towards migration by sea and inaugurated a “closed-ports” strategy based on 
the criminalisation of  humanitarian rescues by NGO vessels operating in the 
Mediterranean Sea to prevent the disembarkation of  the migrants on Italian 
shores.
The previous government (the one that was in charge until June 2018) also 
tried to reduce the NGO’s involvement in search and rescue (SAR) operations 
through the elaboration of  a Code of  Conduct in 2017 which provided that 
Italy would closed its ports to vessels belonging to NGOs that refused to sign 
the same Code of  Conduct3. In this period, NGOs began to be accused of  
representing a pull factor for irregular migration and even of  being connected 
to smugglers and human traffickers.
However, there is no doubt that this approach has been taken to 
extremes since June 2018, the period from which the Italian Government 
adopted a number of  legal acts and informal practices4 intended to deny the 
disembarkation of  migrants rescued at sea not only to NGO vessels5 but 
3 With regard to the Code of  Conduct for NGOs Undertaking Activities in Migrants’ Rescue 
Operations at Sea drafted in July 2017, see Mancini, M. “Italy’s New Migration Control Policy: 
Stemming The Flow of  Migrants From Libya Without Regard For Their Human Rights”, Italian 
yearbook of  international law, vol. XXVII, 2017, p. 259, at p. 268 ff.; Ferri, F. “«Codice di condotta delle 
ONG» e diritti dei migranti: tra diritto internazionale applicabile e carenze dell’attuale approccio 
UE in tema di migrazioni”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2018, pp. 189-198.
4 For an overview on this practice, see catalDi, G., “Migration in the Mediterranean Sea and 
protection of  rights: some recent cases of  Italian practice”, in Cataldi, G., Corleto, M., Pace, 
M. (eds.), Migrations and Fundamental Rights: The Way Forward, Napoli, 2019, p. 9.
5 See, e.g., the case of  the Aquarius, a humanitarian vessel of  the NGO SOS-Méditerranée and 
Médecins sans Frontières, which carried more than 700 migrants in June 2018 after rescuing 
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also to commercial and military ships that have carried out search and rescue 
activities in international waters6. The Circular addressed by the Minister of  
Interior on 18 March 20197 or the so-called Security Decrees of  September 
2018 and June 2019 could be mentioned in this regard. With this new legal 
framework, the Minister of  Interior gained the power to deny private rescue 
vessels access to territorial waters. The sanctions for infringement of  such a 
prohibition are sanctioned with the imposition of  fines on the captain and 
the ship owner ranging from 150 000 to 1 000 000 euros and the seizure and 
impounding of  the vessel.
In assessing the closed-port strategy, it should be observed that 
notwithstanding the right of  the coastal state to decide whether or not to 
allow foreign ships to enter into its territorial sea and internal waters, the 
aim of  saving the lives of  migrants which are in distress on board allows the 
captain of  the ship to enter the area under the sovereignty of  the coastal state 
without authorisation8. In fact, according to the SAR Convention, as amended 
in 2004, carrying out rescue operations does not exhaust the duty to render 
assistance, which extends to the disembarkation of  the rescued persons in a 
place of  safety as soon as reasonably practicable9. This principle has also been 
confirmed by the Italian Supreme Court which recognised that the captain of  
them at high sea and that was not allowed to dock at an Italian port. Or the case of  the Sea 
Watch-3, a humanitarian vessel of  the German NGO Sea Watch, which rescued 53 migrants 
off  the Libyan coast on 19 June 2019 and decided to dock in the Italian port of  Lampedusa 
notwithstanding the express prohibition received from the Italian authorities.
6 See, e.g., the case of  the Diciotti, an Italian military ship that in August 2018 accepted to take 
on board more than one hundred migrants rescued at high sea by other patrol boats of  the 
Italian coast guard and that, after docking in Catania harbour, did not obtain authorisation to 
disembark them for several days. Or the case of  the Gregoretti, another military ship of  the 
Italian coast guard, which saved 131 migrants at high sea in July 2019. After the then Interior 
Italian Minister prohibited the disembarkation of  the migrants, the case was solved when the 
Italian Government six days later obtained a willingness to receive the same migrants from 
five other EU Member States and from the Italian Episcopal Conference.
7 See Circular no. 14100/141 (8) of  15 April 2019.
8 With regard to the possibility to invoke the distress situation in the case that occurred with 
Aquarius in June 2018, see, e.g., papastavriDis, E. “The Aquarius Incident and the Law of  the 
Sea: Is Italy in Violation of  the Relevant Rules?”, EJIL:Talk, 27.6.2018.
9 See, inter alios, trevisanut, S. “Search and Rescue Operations in the Mediterranean: Factor of  
Cooperation or Conflict?”, The international journal of  marine and coastal law, 2010, p. 523, at p. 529.
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the Sea Watch-3 was fulfilling her duty to save the lives of  migrants when she 
decided to disembark them at the Italian port of  Lampedusa notwithstanding 
the prohibition of  the Italian authorities10.
III. THE PERILOUS COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES
With the aim to put an end to the departures from the southern shores 
of  the Mediterranean, Italy has considered it essential to develop cooperation 
with the countries of  origin (or of  departure) of  the migration flows.
This kind of  approach to migration flows is part of  a broader strategy 
– shared with the EU institutions – of  externalisation and of  extra-
territorialisation of  border controls11. With this goal, Italy has concluded 
agreements with several African countries. The most controversial of  these 
deserve mention: the two Protocols of  200712 and the Memorandum of  
201713 with Libya; the Agreement with Tunisia of  201114; the Memorandum 
with Sudan of  201615; and the Agreement with Niger of  201716. Even 
10 See Italian Supreme Court, Judgment no. 6626 of  16 January 2020. For a comment to the 
Judgment, see pitea, c., Zirulia, S. “L’obbligo di sbarcare i naufraghi in un luogo sicuro: 
prove di dialogo tra diritto penale e diritto internazionale a margine del caso Sea Watch”, 
Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2020, pp. 659-687.
11 The distinction between the externalisation and extra-territorialisation has been well explained by 
Del valle GálveZ, A. “Inmigración, derechos humanos y modelo europeo de fronteras. Propuestas 
conceptuales sobre ‘extraterritorialidad’, ‘desterritorialidad’ y ‘externalización’ de controles y flujos 
migratorios”, Revista de estudios jurídicos y criminológicos, 2020, n. 2, p. 145, at p. 162 ff.
12 The two Protocols (a Protocol of  Cooperation and an Additional Operational Protocol) 
were signed in Tripoli on 29 December 2007.
13 Memorandum d’intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo dello sviluppo, del contrasto all’immigrazione illegale, 
al traffico di esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul rafforzamento della sicurezza delle frontiere tra lo Stato della 
Libia e la Repubblica Italiana, signed in Rome on 2 February 2017.
14 Italy and Tunisia signed on 5 April 2011 an Agreement on measures to control the flow of  
irregular migration. The text of  the agreement had not been made public, as underlined by 
ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Judgment of  15 December 2016, Khlaifia and o. v. Italy, application 
no. 16483/12, para. 36.
15 Memorandum d’intesa tra il Dipartimento della pubblica sicurezza del Ministero dell’interno italiano e la 
Polizia nazionale del Ministero dell’interno sudanese per la lotta alla criminalità, gestione delle frontiere e dei 
flussi migratori ed in materia di rimpatrio, signed in Rome on 3 August 2016.
16 Italy signed an Agreement of  Cooperation with Niger in September 2017. This Agreement 
was concluded in a secret form, with the consequence that its content was not known. The 
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though it is not possible to examine in detail the different contents of  those 
agreements, it can be observed that their main goal is to improve the tools 
and the infrastructures of  third countries, enabling them to manage migration 
flows within their territorial and maritime borders. The criticalities of  these 
kinds of  agreements are various. A first problem is connected to the fact 
that Italy has often concluded such agreements in an informal way, claiming 
that they are technical agreements and thus don’t need to be published in 
the Official Journal. Indeed, this kind of  argument is intended to avoid the 
parliamentary control that is required under the Italian Constitution when the 
international agreement deals with political issues, which can be said to apply 
without any doubt to agreements related to the management of  migration 
flows17. Another cause of  concern with these kinds of  agreements is related 
to the reliability of  the partner chosen by Italy for cooperation in the field 
of  migration policies. In this respect, the cooperation carried out with Libya 
is particularly worrisome. Suffice is to think about the Memorandum of  
Understanding on illegal immigration and enforcement of  border security that 
Italy signed on 2 February 2017 with Fayez al-Serraj, the then Head of  the 
UN-backed Libyan Government of  National Accord. The Memorandum was 
concluded to cut off  the Mediterranean route for migrants coming from Libya 
in order to prevent them from reaching the shores of  Italy and subsequently 
enter the European Union. Under this agreement, Italy provides training and 
resources (vessels and other equipment) to the Libyan coast guard. The clear 
aim is to enable Libyan authorities to conduct operations at sea and disembark 
people in Libya. The problem is that NGOs and international organizations 
have reported repeated violations of  the human rights of  migrants during 
rescue operations carried out by the Libyan coast guard18. Furthermore, the 
migrants which are rescued by the Libyan coast guard are brought back to 
Libya where they are held in detention centres in which severe human rights 
Administrative Regional Tribunal of  Roma (Lazio), with its Judgment of  16 November 2018 
no. 11125, imposed an obligation to the Italian Government to publish the Agreement.
17 On this topic, see calaMia, A.M. “Accordi in forma semplificata e accordi segreti: questioni scelte 
di diritto internazionale e di diritto interno”, Ordine internazionale e diritti umani, 2021, p. 1, at p. 13 ff.
18 With regard to the different issues related to the training of  Libyan coast guard, see acosta 
sáncheZ, M.A., “La formación de guardacostas libios: hacia un modelo de sinergia de políticas 
en la gestión integrada de fronteras marítimas europeas”, Revista de derecho comunitario europeo, 
2019, pp. 859-895.
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violations have been widely reported19. We must consider that some of  the 
detention centres (and even the Libyan coast guard) are alleged of  having 
links to human traffickers. In other words, there is a common belief  that Libya 
cannot currently be considered a safe country.
For these reasons, the cooperation carried out by Libya raises serious 
concerns. This cooperation also exposes Italy to international responsibility 
as is shown by the case currently pending in front of  the European Court of  
Human Rights (ECtHR) based on the claim of  17 Nigerian survivors of  a 
shipwreck which happened in November 201720. According to the applicants, 
the Libyan coast guard interfered with the rescue operation that was being 
carried out by the Sea Watch-3. Italy should be held responsible because the 
intervention of  the Libyan coast guard happened under the aegis of  the 
Italian Navy and because Italy should know of  the inhuman conditions in 
the detention centres where the survivors have been brought. However, it 
will not be easy for the applicants to demonstrate that events happened under 
the jurisdiction of  Italy and, consequently, that the ECtHR will consider the 
application admissible21. In fact, a state’s jurisdiction outside its own border 
can be established only in cases in which the same state exercises its effective 
control over the applicant or over the foreign territory where the facts 
occurred22. Nevertheless, a broader approach with regard to the concept of  
jurisdiction has been recently been followed by the Human Rights Committee 
19 See Report of  the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of  
human rights in Libya, and the effectiveness of  technical assistance and capacity-building 
measures received by the Government of  Libya, para. 36 ff., UN Doc. A/HRC/43/75, 
23.1.2020. See also calvo Mariscal, L., “Cooperación entre la UE y Libia en materia de 
inmigración y asilo: la posible creación de plataformas de desembarco”, Revista general de derecho 
europeo, 2020, p. 162, at p. 183 ff.
20 ECtHR, S.S. and others v. Italy, application no. 21660/18 (pending).
21 With regard to the problematic issue related to the possibility to determine whether the 
applicants were under the jurisdiction of  the respondent state in cases concerning migration 
at sea, see, e.g., Moreno-lax, V. “The Architecture of  Functional Jurisdiction: Unpacking 
Contactless Control – On Public Powers, S.S. and Others v. Italy, and the «Operational Model»”, 
German Law Journal, 2020, p. 385; papastavriDis, E. “The European Convention of  Human 
Rights and Migration at Sea: Reading the «Jurisdictional Threshold» of  the Convention Under 
the Law of  the Sea Paradigm”, German law journal, 2020, p. 417.
22 See, e.g., ECtHR, Judgment of  7 July 2011, Al-Skeini and o. v. The United Kingdom, application 
no. 55721/07.
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(HRC) in its case law that is worth a brief  examination as it deals with the 
Italian search and rescue operations in the Central Mediterranean Sea.
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILED RESCUE OPERATIONS
On 4 November 2020, the HRC determined that Italy had violated the 
right to life granted by art. 6, para. 1, of  the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights of  1966 (ICCPR) after failing to promptly respond to a 
distress call received on 10 October 2013 from a vessel which had departed 
from Libya carrying about 400 migrants (mostly Syrian refugees)23. Italy has 
also been held responsible for breach of  the same art. 6, para. 1, in conjunction 
with art. 2 para. 3 ICCPR, for depriving the victims access to an effective 
remedy due to the unjustified delays in carrying out a criminal investigation 
over the incident.
The vessel was in the Maltese search and rescue zone when several dis-
tress calls reached both Italian and Maltese authorities. By the time a Maltese 
patrol boat reached the migrant vessel, it had already capsized. Shortly the-
reafter, the Italian authorities ordered the Italian naval ship Libra to provide 
assistance: the ship was located only about an hour away from the event but 
its intervention in the first moment had been blocked by the same Italian 
authorities. The rescuers arrived too late to prevent the death of  about 200 
migrants.
The complaint to the HRC was lodged against Malta and Italy by three 
Syrians and a Palestine national who survived the accident but lost their 
families. The HRC held the complaint against Malta inadmissible due to the 
non-exhaustion of  domestic remedies24. On the contrary, the HRC decided 
on its merit the complaint presented against Italy. The decision is particularly 
significant with regard to the criterion that the HRC applied in order to 
23 See HRC, decision of  4 November 2020, A.S., D.I., O.I. and G.D. v. Italy, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/130/D/3043/2017. For a first comment to the decision, see vella De FreMeaux, P., 
attarD, F.G. “Rescue at Sea and the Establishment of  Jurisdiction: New Direction from 
the Human Rights Committee?”, OpinioJuris.org, 3 March 2021; citroni, G. “Operations 
at Sea: the Human Rights Committee’s Views on the Case A.S., D.I. and G.D. v. Italy and 
Malta”, OpinioJuris.org, 9 March 2021; Milanovic, M. “Drowning Migrants, the Human Rights 
Committee, and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations”, EJIL:Talk!, 16 March 2021.
24 See HRC, decision of 13 March 2020, A.S., D.I., O.I. and G.D. v. Malta, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/128/D/3043/2017.
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determine whether the jurisdiction of  Italy could be established in the case, 
with the consequent extraterritorial application of  the ICCPR. The HRC 
recalled its General Comment no. 3625 according to which every state party has 
an obligation to respect and ensure the right to life of  all persons over whom 
it exercises power or effective control, including persons located outside any 
territory effectively controlled by the same state in cases in which the right 
to life is nonetheless affected by its military or other activities in a direct and 
reasonably foreseeable manner26. Furthermore, according to the same General 
Comment, state parties are also required to respect and protect the lives of  all 
individuals who find themselves in a situation of  distress at sea in accordance 
with their international obligations on rescue at sea.
Considering the particular circumstances of  the case, the HRC affirmed 
that “a special relationship of  dependency” had been established between 
the individuals on the vessel in distress and Italy. This special relationship 
was deemed to be based on the initial contact made by the vessel in distress 
with the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC) of  Rome, the close 
proximity of  the Italian ship Libra, the ongoing involvement of  the MRCC in 
the rescue operation, the legal obligations incurred by Italy under international 
law of  the sea and, in particular, under the SOLAS Regulations and the SAR 
Convention. On these grounds, the HRC considered that “the individuals on 
the vessel in distress were directly affected by the decisions taken by the Italian 
authorities in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable in light of  the relevant 
legal obligations of  Italy, and they were thus subject to Italy’s jurisdiction for 
the purpose of  the Covenant”27. This solution was not supported by all the 
members of  the HRC. In their dissenting opinion, some members of  the HRC 
affirmed that Italy did not coordinate the search and rescue operation and did 
not establish an effective control over the individuals of  the vessel in distress28. 
In another dissenting opinion, it was observed that the decision taken by the 
HRC might have the effect of  convincing states parties to the Covenant to 
avoid coming close to boats in distress so as to refrain from establishing the 
25 See HRC, General Comment no. 36, Article 6 (Right to Life), para. 63, 3.9.2019, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35.
26 See HRC, A.S., D.I., O.I. and G.D. v. Italy, para. 7.5.
27 See HRC, A.S., D.I., O.I. and G.D. v. Italy, para. 7.8.
28 See Individual Opinion of  Yuval Shany, Christof  Heyns and Photini Pazartzis (dissenting), 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/130/D/3043/2017, Annex 1.
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“special relationship of  dependency” which triggers the jurisdiction of  the 
state29.
The decision of  the HRC offers interesting insights on the exercise of  the 
jurisdiction of  a state in case of  rescue operations on high seas and could also 
affect the attitude of  Italian authorities towards such activities. The hope is that 
Italy will, in the future, take its responsibility for rescue operations more and 
more seriously and will not escape from them by relying on the intervention 
of  other countries.
V. HAS THERE BEEN A REAL SHIFT IN ITALIAN MIGRATION POLICY?
The closed-ports strategy and the criminalisation of  the activities of  migrant 
rights defenders involved in search and rescue activities has been strongly 
criticised at the international level30. This has created a great expectation for 
a policy shift. In particular, a prompt erasure of  the two Security Decrees 
already mentioned was desired and a different attitude towards migration by 
sea was expected.
Notwithstanding the declaration of  its willingness to overcome the 
previous attitude towards migration by sea and despite knowing the 
humanitarian concerns related to the conduct of  the Libyan coast guard, the 
Italian Government that has been in charge since September 2019 (the second 
chaired by Giuseppe Conte), has consented to the automatic renewal of  the 
2017 Memorandum with Libya31. This is in spite of  calls from human rights 
groups and institutions to revoke the agreement32. However, after the renewal, 
29 See Individual Opinion of  Andreas Zimmermann (dissenting), UN Doc. CCPR/
C/130/D/3043/2017, Annex 2.
30 See, e.g., Mandates of  the Special Rapporteur on the situation of  human rights defenders; 
the Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity; the Special Rapporteur 
on the human rights of  migrants; the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of  racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; the Special Rapporteur on torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and the Special Rapporteur 
on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, 15 May 2019, AL ITA 4/2019.
31 On 2 February 2020, the Memorandum has been automatically renewed, for another three years.
32 See, e.g., the letter of  the Commissioner for Human Rights of  the Council of  Europe 
addressed to the Italian Minister of  Foreign Affairs on 13 February 2020 after which the 
Memorandum was automatically renewed, https://rm.coe.int/letter-to-mr-luigi-di-maio-
minister-of-foreign-affairs-and-internation/16809c8262.
Agora-Marinai.indd   10 18/07/2021   23:45:14
Simone mARinAi
Peace & Security – Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, No 9, January-December 2021
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2021.i9.1501
11
the dialogue for the amendments has resumed, but so far concrete results have 
not been achieved.
On the other hand, in October 2019, the possibility to amend the Code 
of  Conduct for NGOs was discussed. The new Italian Minister of  Interior 
convened a meeting with the main NGOs with this goal. The reopening of  the 
dialogue with NGOs was good news, but it has not been followed by concrete 
acts. After being confirmed under the government chaired by Mario Draghi, 
this same Minister in March 2021 again declared her willingness to reconvene 
as soon as possible a table with NGOs33, but it is not yet known when this 
meeting will be held and, above all, what kind of  new regulation the Italian 
Government will propose.
Some of  the provisions contained in the Security Decrees were amended 
with the adoption of  Decree Law no. 130 of  202034. However, the power of  naval 
interdiction of  the Minister of  the Interior has in substance been maintained35. 
A violation of  a Ministerial order of  interdiction can be sanctioned with the 
reclusion for up to two years and with a fine from 10.000 to 50.000 euros. The 
new provision does not apply in cases in which the rescue operation has been 
immediately communicated to the competent MRCC and to the flag state and 
is conducted in accordance with the instructions of  the competent authorities 
for search and rescue at sea. Although this provision expressly states the need 
to respect, inter alia, the status of  refugees, concerns may derive with regard to 
the applicability of  the power of  interdiction in cases in which the competent 
search and rescue authority whose instructions have not been respected by the 
humanitarian vessel belongs to an unsafe country36. Take, for example, the case 
of  a humanitarian rescue vessel that doesn’t comply with the order received by 
the Libyan search and rescue authorities to disembark the rescued migrants on 
Libyan shores because Libya is not a safe country. In this case, could the Italian 
33 See Press release, 24.3.2021, https://www.interno.gov.it/it/stampa-e-comunicazione/
interventi-e-interviste/lamorgese-ue-fermi-sbarchi-dalla-libia-nuovo-patto-sui-migranti.
34 The Decree Law no. 130 of  21 October 2020 was later converted into Law no. 173 of  18 
December 2020.
35 According to art. 1 par. 2 of  the Decree no. 130/2020, the Minister of  Interior in con-
junction with the Minister of  Defence and with the Minister of  Transports, after having 
informed the Prime Minister, can limit or prohibit the transit or the stay in the territorial 
waters to vessels for reasons of  public order and public security.
36 See pitea, c., s. Zirulia, S., loc. cit., p. 686.
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authorities refuse entry of  the NGO vessel to an Italian port? The Decree no. 
130 doesn’t erase such a risk.
There is no doubt that the attitude towards NGO search and rescue 
operations has become, at least in part, more favourable. But this doesn’t 
mean that the port-closed strategy can be considered completely overcome. 
It is significant that the Italian Government with Inter-ministerial Decree no. 
150 of  7 April 2020, which was adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
established that for the period of  the health emergency, the Italian ports cannot 
be considered a “place of  safety” according to the SAR Convention with 
regard to rescue operations conducted outside the Italian SAR zone by foreign 
vessels. The aim of  this Decree is to prevent NGO foreign flag vessels from 
disembarking migrants rescued at sea in Italian ports during the pandemic. The 
Decree raised many concerns that we cannot examine in this context37: we 
only observe that with such an administrative act, Italy pretends to unilaterally 
derogate from international customary rule which imposes the duty to rescue 
and assist people in distress at sea and from other international obligations 
related to the law of  the sea and human rights which are binding on Italy.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE NEED TO ENHANCE COOPERATION AT THE EU 
LEVEL AND THE INADEQUACY OF THE SOLUTIONS PROPOSED WITH THE NEW PACT 
ON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM
With this brief  contribution, we have underlined some of  the different 
problems that the recent Italian practice related to the control of  migration 
flows by sea may raise.
The policy of  closure of  ports based on the criminalisation of  the NGO 
search and rescue operations has been mitigated by the Italian Government 
since September 2019 but cannot be considered completely overcome. In fact, 
the tools which allow the Minister of  the Interior to deny to NGO vessels 
the disembarking of  migrants rescued at sea on Italian shores have not been 
dismantled. However, there is no doubt that the less tense climate that the 
Italian Government has established in the management of  migration by sea 
has favoured the cooperation with other EU Member States. In particular, a 
37 The different concerns raised by the Decree have been stressed by Munari, F., “L’emergenza 
COVID-19 nell’ambito degli obblighi dell’Italia ai sensi della Convenzione SAR: l’insostenibile 
«intermittenza» del luogo sicuro per i migranti diretti verso l’Italia”, SIDIBlog, 16.4.2020.
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signal in this direction was represented by the Malta Declaration, according 
to which a voluntary and temporary mechanism to identify an alternative 
place of  disembarkation was provided for situations in which Italy or Malta 
would be facing a disproportionate migratory pressure. On the basis of  pre-
declared pledges prior to the disembarkation and under the coordination of  
the European Commission, the mechanism would contribute to the swift 
relocation of  asylum seekers rescued at sea. The Declaration confirmed the 
commitment to enhancing the cooperation with Southern Mediterranean 
third countries to fight illegal migration and expressly affirmed that vessels 
engaged in rescue operations (thus also NGO vessels) should refrain from 
obstructing the activity of  the Libyan coast guard. The cooperation developed 
through the Malta Declaration had positive aspects, but it was limited to the 
countries that accepted participation in it38, had a nonbinding nature and 
required an ad hoc consensus. The Declaration expired at the end of  March 
2020 because of  nonrenewal. However, the Declaration served as a source 
of  inspiration for the New Pact on Migration and Asylum presented by the 
European Commission in September 2020. In particular, in the proposal 
of  a Migration Management Regulation, a specific process was introduced 
to address the disembarkation in accordance with following SAR operations 
under the coordination of  the Commission, as was a relocation mechanism 
with the aim to institutionalise the temporary solidarity mechanism set up in the 
Malta Declaration39. The impression is that, whether or not these new rules are 
adopted, the current ineffective system of  solidarity vis-a-vis the coastal states 
will be replicated40. With the New Pact, a Recommendation was also drafted 
38 On 23 September 2019, France, Germany, Italy and Malta participated in La Valletta at the 
summit that was concluded with the adoption of  the Malta Declaration. Only three other 
states (Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal) had informally affirmed support of  the Malta 
Declaration during the Justice and Home Affairs Council of  7 and 8 October 2019.
39 On the mechanism of  solidarity provided by the Proposal of  a Regulation of  the European 
Parliament and of  the Council on asylum and migration management, COM (2020) 610 def. 
of  23.9.2020, see Maiani, F., “«A fresh Start» or One More Clunker? Dublin and Solidarity 
in the New Pact”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, https://eumigrationlawblog.eu, 
20.10.2020; MorGese G., “La solidarietà tra Stati membri dell’Unione europea nel nuovo Patto 
sulla migrazione e l’asilo”, I Post di AISDUE, II, 2020, Focus “La proposta di Patto su immigrazione 
e asilo”, n. 2, 23.10.2020, p. 16, at 22 ff.
40 On this view, see poli, S., “«Flexible» cooperation between the European Union and third 
countries to contain migration flows and the uncertainties of  «compensation measures»: the case 
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on cooperation among Member States concerning operations carried out by 
vessels owned or operated by private entities for the purpose of  search and 
rescue activities41. Although the Recommendation adds “nothing to the current 
EU (underwhelming) rescue response”42, it aims to strengthen cooperation 
between Member States, in particular between flag and coastal Member States 
and with the Commission through the newly instituted Contact Group43 in 
relation to search and rescue operations carried out by private vessels.
The inadequacy of  the New Pact of  Migration and Asylum in taking 
into account the request for a fairer distribution of  responsibility and more 
solidarity coming from the Southern European Mediterranean countries has 
been recently denounced by Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain, which 
gathered during the first Ministerial Meeting of  the “Med-5 Group” held in 
Athens on 19 and 20 March 202144.
The solution proposed in the New Pact will need to be improved and 
amended with a view towards producing a real shift in the management of  
migration flows arriving by sea. However, there is no doubt that efficient 
solutions can only be found through the strengthening of  cooperation at 
the European level, considering that the EU – in contrast to Member States 
individually – could have the force to stand as a global actor able to deal 
with the causes that induce migrants to leave and, at the same time, to act in 
accordance with the imperatives of  solidarity and respect for human rights45.
of  the resettlement of  refugees in EU Member States”, DPCE online, 2020, p. 5272, at p. 5297.
41 Doc. C(2020) 6468 of  23.9.2020.
42 In these terms, Moreno-lax, V. “The EU (Non-)rescue Paradigm”, EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law and Policy, https://eumigrationlawblog.eu, 3.2.2021. 
43 The European Contact Group on Search and Rescue is composed by relevant stakeholders, 
including Frontex, NGOs, academics and international organisations, and has as its goal to 
develop best practices, exchange information and reinforce cooperation between flag and 
coastal Member States. The first meeting of  the Contact Group was held on 22 March 2021.
44 The Declaration adopted in Athens by the “Med-5 Group” is available at https://www.pio.
gov.cy/en/press-releases-article.html?id=19113#flat.
45 See catalDi, G., “Migrations in the Mediterranean between protection of  Human Rights 
and border control”, Revue québécoise de droit international, vol. 2-1, 2018, p. 41 at p. 53.
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